

**Supplemental materials for**

**Does the Procedural Act of Electing Leaders Enhance Cooperation  
in Divided Societies? Experimental Evidence from Lebanon.**

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## A. English-language transcript of the supraordinate group appeal video

Josephine Zoughaib (moderator): We have now reached the end of 2016. We have a lot of big problems in the country. Lebanon has become one of the most corrupt countries. I imagine we have a lot of big problems, so I don't know Mr. Radwan if you have reached a conclusion that there is a problem bigger than the others, which have gotten us here. Can you give us a little bit. . . [of what you think]

Radwan Mortada (Shia): The main idea is that the biggest problem, which is bigger than all the rest, which if we solve we can reach a better country, in principle is the crisis of sectarianism and the sectarianism that exists in Lebanon and the parties' leaders who are accordingly dividing the country and transforming Lebanon to. . .

JZ: So the sectarianism is leading to the quota system? Everyone is taking their own share and that's why we got here? RM: Everyone is taking their own share and in the same time when they are corrupt and from a certain sect, the other sects cannot reach them (hold them accountable) unless their own sect lifts the political cover (political immunity) over them.

JZ: What is the reason to why we got to this system, which has become a corrupt system and all countries acknowledge this issue, we have ranked the 3rd most corrupt country in the world?

Nabil Moukaddem (Sunni): I think the main problem we have is the sectarian distribution. Our main and first problem is our election system. I want to talk a little bit about our election system. I think if we make a new and modern electoral system and we get rid of sectarianism, we are able to solve a big part of the problem. I think, today, the question asked is, after a couple of months we will be having parliamentary elections if everything goes smoothly supposedly. We are still today prisoners of laws and legislations that are so far from. . .

JZ: The 60's Law [Election Law] is being discussed today.

NM: Yes true. . . that are so far from the spirit and progress. The question that we want to ask is: Until when are we going to keep digging out worn out and silly laws and until when is Lebanon going to keep perpetuating this sectarian system. I want to tell you something. The process of dismantling sectarianism, just so we are not very hopeful, doesn't come from changing only the electoral text. It is a long-term educational process. It starts from history books, starts from the way we raise our kids, a number of things, but an electoral law is one of the examples. Lebanon today is susceptible to explode at any second. [unclear] That is why if we do not have an established national unity, we are susceptible to things escalating at any second as a result to certain regional factors. These guys know it better than I do.

JZ: But the Lebanese society is finding the problem elsewhere. It is finding that if there is no cooperation currently between 2 very big sects, which are the Sunni and the Shia, I can't imagine that we can agree on an electoral law or a transparent judiciary system.

Mohammad Abdullah (Sunni): After we called it the Cedar Revolution in 2005, the big phenomenon that we witnessed in Martyr's Square, we saw that the hunkering down came back over a certain political period. Until there was a major crisis in Lebanon that unified all of Lebanon, that is the garbage crisis that generated another phenomenon: everyone, the Sunni, the Shia, the Christian, and other religions went down to the streets for a certain cause. But we know that regardless of the size of movement in Lebanon, we know that sectarianism leads to no results. When the garbage crisis happened and what we call the civic movement, which I participated in, sectarianism came in to break down this collective.

You are going today to the streets because you saw that the garbage is at your doorstep, but when it became such that my leader or your leader or his leader are supposed to take action and responsibility, there was a smart political move, if you may, from the leaders of the sects to dismantle this gathering. . .

JZ: You are confirming that the citizen is unable to abandon sectarianism for the sake of his leader even over a very important issue such as the garbage crisis.

MA: The citizen did abandon it, and he protested in the streets. However, afterwards, there was work done to dismantle this movement because they united, then they became factions again and politics entered with its divisional, confessional, and sectarian methodology and led to a division and inability to arrive at a conclusion.

Radwan Aqil (Shia): Starting from what my colleagues have talked about, we don't live in a normal country. For example, if Lebanon were to play a soccer game with any foreign country, we wouldn't find all the Lebanese people. While we find the Iranian people all as one, in a soccer game for example, the same with Egypt, we live in a state of sectarianism, as soon we mention the name of the street, we know the political affiliation of the street and the area. Let's admit it, if today we want to go buy a house from a person from another sect, it hasn't been that easy to do it and its very well known. Today there is a percentage, but this doesn't mean. . .

JZ: It has to be 10% Sunni in a certain building. . .

RA: But this doesn't mean that the relationships in the country between people is really that bad. No! On the contrary, we still have communities in universities and institutions etc. But I, as a journalist, I say we do not live normally in a normal country. To go back to the Sunni/Shia conversations, which has been brought up a lot. I don't want to say it's a disagreement; it's a contrast that goes back 1400 years and unfortunately is still until today used to bring up a conflict. Let's also admit that in the last 10 years the marriage between the Sunni and Shia has decreased, before it hasn't been this bad. I want to talk a little bit about the Shia movement. In the civil war, the Shia movement was a container for the National Movement led by Kamal Jounblat. It wasn't lead by a Shia leader although there were a lot of Shia leaders. Lately there has been a lot of talk about the conflict, I just want to say, today, there is a Sunni in Tripoli who doesn't know Tyre, and there is a Shia in Tyre who doesn't know Tarii Ljdideh and doesn't know Tripoli.

JZ: They don't know or they're not letting them know?

RA: We all take responsibility as press, as political powers, as parties, and sects. And because they are scared. Imagine this happens in this small country. Lets go back to the problem, which is that once someone is born, his confession follows him from birth to the grave. And today, let us admit it, Wasta is killing us. Wherever it is: in getting a degree, a job, etc. The Sunni-Shia conflict also made us think about the region with the Gulf countries and the Arab countries and how it affects this region. Otherwise, we as Sunni and Shia in this country, we lived together. Shia, still until today, Jamal Abdel Naser pictures are put up in Shia houses. Our sectarian system, the quota system, and sectarianism are pushing for continuation of this conflict. Also in this country, there is no nationality. For example, why are the quotas calculated for the biggest sects: Maronites, Otrthodox, Shia, Sunna, and the Druze have no right to be represented. If Einstein were Druze he wouldn't be allowed to run the ministry of foreign affairs. Kamal Jounblat ran the Ministry of interior and he was amongst the best ministers. Prince Majeed Erslen ran the Ministry of Defense. Today everything is constrained and there is injustice even within the same sect.

RM: So we have the option: we either agree to rebuild the country on the right fundamentals and I agree that we cannot do this before we transcend sectarianism in our Electoral Law, because the big figures with the influence to change things, are benefiting from the current situation.

JZ: we are talking about benefits between the sects today.

RM: True because and there is another issue in the sectarian realm if we can say. When the youth want to apply for the military, or the judiciary school, or any job, they first need to go to the alleged leader of their sect so he can work it out for them. And they can't make him angry because he controls what they do for a living. He is the one who guarantees whether they are accepted or not.

JZ: Where is the Lebanese society going and if there is an opportunity to fix this sectarian system or the elections, how far can we go as you see it as Lebanese citizens, not as journalists? As a Lebanese citizen Radwan, where are we headed?

RM: When someone knows what his or her problem is, that is half of the treatment. At least we know that we have a problem, and we know that sectarianism is a problem, and we know that if we don't agree to sit together and actually sit together to discuss and plan a common future that is good for everyone, we won't be able to succeed. And it seems that in all the sects, all the Lebanese people, educated or not, know that this is the problem.

NM: I want to stress on one thing about the word "peoples". We are one unified peoples with unified goals and benefits, there are political and sectarian disagreements, yes, but it can be fixed even if it's very difficult at times. There is still in inter-religious marriage in Lebanon, this also a very important thing. Even the Lebanese people, in their nature, are peaceful not violent. Of course in the Civil war there were people from all sects that held weapons and fought, but the majority was expressing their opinion verbally, the percentage that held weapons and killed people depending on religion is small relative to the rest of the Lebanese people. Even the people who forced the migration of others, they are minority in their sects. If you are thorough in checking, you will see that in every sect the majority refuses these actions and practices and the evidence is that after the war the harmony, more or less, resurfaced again.


JZ: So we are confirming that the Lebanese people are not sectarian in nature.

NM: The Lebanese people are not sectarian. They are creative people who love life but the only problem is that they are constrained by sectarian laws after the false independence in 1943. The Lebanese people need to look after their benefits. As my colleagues were saying, if you want to put your child in schools or get a job, you need to go back to your sect's political reference and leader. I, as a Lebanese person today, they are saying they are forming a government, why do I care if it is all Muslims or all Christians if the members are qualified and are able to perform their tasks, why do I care if they are 30 Muslims and 30 Christians as long as they are providing me good service and look after me. If they are all Orthodox, why do I care?

RA: It is your right to be with a political leader and you have the right to support him/her, but regardless, this leader today can deprive you from [unclear word]. Be open to the other and marry whomever you want. Hopefully, that with the new generation we are able to reach real nationalism that Hussein Fadl-Allah and Gregoire Haddad used to talk about, and hopefully we think about what we are leaving our children and grandchildren in this country.

JZ: Thank you. I want to conclude now about how much we are connected to this country, which is why we are staying and I imagine that the Lebanese youth who is participating in the streets and in university elections is insisting to stay with good values. I think we started the conversation with Sunni-Shia conflict and ended with Gregoire Haddad and Sir Fadl-Allah, we arrived at the conclusion that we are sitting together on one table with one hope that hopefully hopefully hopefully in a new era or an era in the future because I have hope in the youth as you said Radwan, the coming generations that are raised on these values and that what we witness over the past 40 years isn't going to get us anywhere.

## B. Contributions in the standard public goods game before leader selection



Note: Markers and vertical lines indicate average contribution levels and their 95% confidence intervals, respectively, in the experimental conditions

## C. Task instructions

### Standard Public Goods Game

In this next task, you also receive 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 tokens to put into a common pool to be divided among all the participants. Once everyone has made their decision, the money in the common pool will be multiplied by two and divided equally among all the group members. Whatever tokens you do not put in the common pool are yours to keep. Your earnings then are whatever tokens you do not contribute to the common pool and the tokens that you receive once the common pool is divided among all members of the group.

Let us try this to see how the decision task works; these practice rounds do not count towards your earnings. [The table manager distributes ten tokens to every participant] Imagine that no one contributes to the common pool; then everyone is left with their 10 tokens in earnings. Now, imagine that everyone contributes their whole amount to the common pool. [Table manager ensures that all participants put 10 tokens in the middle, adds another 60 tokens to the common pool, and returns 20 tokens to every participant] Everyone receives 20 tokens back. In this final round, imagine that people around the table contribute 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 tokens. [The table manager ensures that these are the contributions made by participants; multiplies 30 by 2 [=60], adds 30 tokens to the common pool, and distributes 10 tokens back to every participant.]

Now we are ready to do this task properly. We will play the decision game for five rounds. At the beginning of every round you will start with just 10 tokens. We are not going to use actual tokens though; we would like you to write down how many of the 10 tokens you contribute towards the common pool in every round. You will write down your contributions towards the common pool for every round secretly, shielding your decision sheet from others, on a decision sheet that is in your packet. At the end of every round I will announce how many tokens every participant contributed without revealing anyone's identity; what the total contribution was; and how much every participant would receive from the common pool. After all the tasks are completed, we will calculate your actual earnings by picking one of the five rounds at random. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is \$2 and the maximum is \$13.

### Modified Public Goods Game with randomly selected leader

This task is the same as the one we tried before completing the questionnaire with just one important difference. This time the table manager will select an Observer at random from among the participants by throwing dice. The Observer will decide on the minimal acceptable level of contribution to the common pool AFTER all the contributions have been announced. The Observer him or herself does not make any contributions. Those who made a smaller contribution than the level announced by the Observer will be fined 4 tokens when their earnings are determined. For example, imagine that five table members (that is everyone, except for the Observer) make contributions of 0, 2, 4, 6, and 8 tokens. In the previous iteration of this task, the resultant total of 20 tokens would have been multiplied by 2, and each of the five participants would have received 8 tokens back  $((20 \times 2) / 5)$ . Imagine that this time the Observer decides that the minimally acceptable level of contribution is 4. This would mean that two participants, those who contributed 0 and 2 tokens, are fined 4 tokens each and only receive 4 instead of 8

tokens from the pool. Note that the Observer receives 10 tokens at the beginning of every round but pays the fee of one token for each person fined. In this example, the Observer would get to keep 8 tokens after fining two people. The amount that you earn from this task will be determined after all the tasks are completed by calculating the results of one randomly selected round of the five. Let us now begin this task. Like before, this task has five rounds. I begin by casting a die to randomly select the Observer.

#### Modified Public Goods Game with randomly elected leader

This task is the same as the one we tried before completing the questionnaire with just one important difference. This time everyone in our group will vote to elect an Observer from among the people at this table. The Observer will decide on the minimal acceptable level of contribution to the common pool AFTER all the contributions have been announced. The Observer him or herself does not make any contributions. Those who made a smaller contribution than the level announced by the Observer will be fined 4 tokens when their earnings are determined. For example, imagine that five table members (that is everyone, except for the Observer) make contributions of 0, 2, 4, 6, and 8 tokens. In the previous iteration of this task, the resultant total of 20 tokens would have been multiplied by 2, and each of the five participants would have received 8 tokens back  $((20 \times 2) / 5)$ . Imagine that this time the Observer decides that the minimally acceptable level of contribution is 4. This would mean that two participants, those who contributed 0 and 2 tokens, are fined 4 tokens each and only receive 4 instead of 8 tokens from the pool. Note that the Observer receives 10 tokens at the beginning of every round but pays the fee of one token for each person fined. In this example, the Observer would get to keep 8 tokens after fining two people. The amount that you earn from this task will be determined after all the tasks are completed by calculating the results of one randomly selected round of the five.

Everyone at this table has a chance to vote for the Observer. Please turn to the election ballots for this decision task. Sunni participants at this table have IDs 1, 2, and 3. Shia participants have IDs 4, 5, and 6. Please write in just one ID number in secret that you are voting for. To maintain confidentiality, we will not tell you which ID corresponds to which participant. I will then tally the votes to determine if there is a winner. If there is a tie then I will determine the winner by casting a die. The amount that you earn from this task will be determined after all the tasks are completed by calculating the results of one randomly selected round of the five.



#### D. Descriptive statistics about the participants

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	240	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	240	37.68	13.22	18	64
Education	235	3.51	1.49	0	6
Household monthly income	221	1.03	1.24	0	6
Religiosity	230	1.13	0.58	0	2

Note: Education 0= Illiterate/No formal education, 1= Elementary, 2=Preparatory/Basic, 3=Secondary, 4= Mid-level diploma/Professional or technical, 5= BA, 6= MA or above; Income 0= Under 1,000,000 LBP, 1=1,000,001 – 3,000,000 LBP, 2= 3,000,001 – 5,000,000 LBP, 3= 5,000,001 – 7,000,000 LBP, 4= 7,000,001 – 9,000,000 LBP, 5= 9,000,001 – 11,000,000 LBP, 6= Over 11,000,001 LBP; Religiosity 0 = Not at all religious, 1=Somewhat religious, 2=Religious

## **E. Wording of survey questions**

Female: “What is your gender” Male(0), Female(1).

Age: “How old are you?” (open-ended question).


Education: “What is your education level?” Illiterate/No formal education (0), Elementary (1), Preparatory/Basic (2), Secondary (3), Mid-level diploma/Professional or technical (4), BA (5), MA or above (6).

Household monthly income: “What is your household’s monthly income?” Under 1,000,000 LBP (0), 1,000,001 – 3,000,000 LBP (1), 3,000,001 – 5,000,000 LBP (2), 5,000,001 – 7,000,000 LBP (3), 7,000,001 – 9,000,000 LBP (4), 9,000,001 – 11,000,000 LBP (5), Over 11,000,001 LBP (6).

Religiosity: “Would you describe yourself as religious, somewhat religious, or not at all religious?” Not at all religious (0), Somewhat religious (1), Religious (2).

Democracy contradicts to Islam: “Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the statements below: Democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of Islam” Agree (0), Disagree (1).

## F. Sample representativeness




Note: Income is compared to Arab Barometer Wave 3 data (variable q1015), whereas Age and Education are compared to Arab Barometer Wave 4 data (variables q1001 and t1003)

## G. Balance checks

	Obs. (control vs. treatment)	Mean (s.d.) of control	Mean (s.d.) of treatment	Diff.	t-value
<i>Appeal treatment</i>					
Female	240 (120 vs. 120)	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.00	0.00
Age	240 (120 vs. 120)	37.56 (12.85)	37.81 (13.63)	-0.25	-0.15
Education	235 (116 vs. 119)	3.53 (1.39)	3.49 (1.58)	0.04	0.20
Household monthly income	221 (110 vs. 111)	1.03 (1.17)	1.04 (1.31)	-0.01	-0.06
Religiosity	230 (112 vs. 118)	1.12 (0.60)	1.15 (0.56)	-0.04	-0.48
<i>Election treatment</i>					
Female	240 (120 vs. 120)	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.00	0.00
Age	240 (120 vs. 120)	37.18 (12.76)	38.19 (13.69)	-1.02	-0.60
Education	235 (120 vs. 115)	3.57 (1.47)	3.44 (1.51)	0.12	0.63
Household monthly income	221 (111 vs. 110)	1.05 (1.22)	1.01 (1.27)	0.05	0.27
Religiosity	230 (116 vs. 114)	1.15 (0.61)	1.11 (0.54)	0.04	0.54


Note: Reduction in the numbers of observations results from participants' marking failure; T-tests (two-sided) are conducted; no significant difference at the 5% level for every pairwise comparison

## H. Appeal persuasiveness



*Note: Participants were asked about each expert's persuasiveness in the video-recorded conversation; responses are measured between 0 indicating 'very unpersuasive' and 3 indicating 'very persuasive'; 120 respondents were asked but some responses were unidentifiable or unmarked; the average score is 2.32 (n=111)*


## I. Contributions in the modified public goods game across five rounds



*Note: Average contributions across five rounds; grey vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.*

The results are described as a simple comparison of average contributions to the common pool in Table 2. The highest level of contributions at 8.70 tokens (of 10) is in the treatment that combines a leader election with a prior appeal to the Lebanese national identity. Those that only participated in a leader election but were not subject to the supraordinate group appeal contributed the least at 7.05 tokens. Participants who were exposed to the common ingroup appeal alone contributed 8.03 tokens. Average contributions across all the conditions are statistically different from each other with the exception of contributions in a pairwise comparison of control (no election + no appeal) and of those not voting in an election but hearing a supraordinate group appeal (no election + appeal). This pattern of results suggests that elections on their own are ineffective in bringing about higher cooperation in divided societies and become effective only when combined with a prior appeal to a supraordinate identity.


## J. Average minimum levels of acceptable contributions



*Note: Markers and vertical lines indicate average minimum levels and their 95% confidence intervals, respectively, in the experimental conditions*

On average, leaders set the minimally acceptable level of contributions at 6.25 tokens across the four conditions: this was highest in the Appeal + Election condition at 7.15 tokens and lowest at 5.6 tokens in the No Appeal + No Election condition. While leader policies are statistically different in the first round, when pooled for the remaining four rounds they are statistically indistinguishable at  $p=0.12$ . Leaders' sanctioning policies across the five rounds are reported in Appendix H. Around 15% of participants were sanctioned for failure to meet the minimal contribution levels set post-facto by leaders; this proportion was highest at 0.22 in the No Appeal + Election condition and lowest at 0.09 in the No Appeal + No Election condition.

### K. Proportion of sanctioned participants across rounds



*Note: Markers and vertical lines indicate average proportions and their 95% confidence intervals, respectively, in the experimental conditions*



## L. Regression results regarding Hypotheses 4 and 5

	Model Hypothesis	1 H4	2 H5
	Leader election	-0.721 (0.596)	-1.399 (1.146)
	Appeal	0.080 (0.500)	0.584 (0.955)
	Leader election × Appeal	1.348 (0.696)	0.425 (1.340)
	Leader from ingroup	0.140 (0.714)	
	Leader from ingroup × Leader election	-0.033 (0.790)	
	Leader from ingroup × Appeal	0.371 (0.853)	
	Leader from ingroup × Leader election × Appeal	-0.804 (1.103)	
	Democracy and Islam compatible		-0.198 (1.095)
	Democracy and Islam compatible × Leader election		0.731 (1.285)
	Democracy and Islam compatible × Appeal		-0.618 (1.380)
	Democracy and Islam compatible × Leader election × Appeal		1.143 (1.625)
	Constant	-0.818 (1.227)	-0.118 (1.348)
	Controls	Included	Included
	Num. of observations	700	656
	Num. of participants	175	164
	Num. of teams	39	39
	$R^2$	0.562	0.565

*Note: All models use random-effects linear regressions with team moderator indicators; all controls in Model 3 of Table 2 are included; standard errors, clustered at the team level, are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .*