


**Building Cooperation Among Groups in Conflict:
An Experiment on Intersectarian Cooperation in Lebanon**

ONLINE APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS AND REFERENCE POPULATIONS (MUSLIM RESIDENTS OF BEIRUT AND MUSLIM CITIZENS OF LEBANON).



Note: Demographic measures come from responses to the third (monthly household income) and fourth (age and education) waves of ArabBarometer by Muslim residents of Beirut and Lebanon; monthly household income and education levels are recoded for comparison purposes; numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations.

APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS

Understanding of the task: “How well were you able to understand the instructions for what you were supposed to do as part of this study? (0) Did not understand the instructions at all; (1) Understood instructions quite poorly; (2) Understood instructions quietly well; (3) Understood instructions fully.”


Age: “How old are you? Please write your age in the space provided.” Open question.

Education: “What is your education level? (0) Illiterate/ No formal education; (1) Elementary; (2) Preparatory/ Basic; (3) Secondary; (4) Mid-level diploma/ Professional or technical; (5) BA; (6) MA or above.”

Household income: “What is your HOUSEHOLD’S monthly income? (0) Under 1,000,000 LBP; (1) 1,000,001 – 3,000,000 LBP; (2) 3,000,001 – 5,000,000 LBP; (3) 5,000,001 – 7,000,000 LBP; (4) 7,000,001 – 9,000,000 LBP; (5) 9,000,001 – 11,000,000 LBP; (6) Over 11,000,001 LBP”

Trust in Sunni and Shia groups: How much do you trust the members of each of the following groups? Shia Muslim/ Sunni Muslim. (0) Do not trust at all; (1) Mostly don’t trust; (2) Mostly trust; (3) Trust completely.”

APPENDIX C: EXPERTS' PERSUASIVENESS SCORES DISAGGREGATED BY INDIVIDUAL EXPERT AND PARTICIPANTS' SECT



*Note: Q8-Q12 used: "How persuasive did you find each of the following experts?"
n=126-133.*

APPENDIX D: EXPERT VIDEO TRANSCRIPT (English)

Josephine Zoughaib (moderator): We have now reached the end of 2016. We have a lot of big problems in the country. Lebanon has become one of the most corrupt countries. I imagine we have a lot of big problems, so I don't know Mr. Radwan if you have reached a conclusion that there is a problem bigger than the others, which have gotten us here. Can you give us a little bit...[of what you think]

Radwan Mortada (Shia): The main idea is that the biggest problem, which is bigger than all the rest, which if we solve we can reach a better country, in principle is the crisis of sectarianism and the sectarianism that exists in Lebanon and the parties' leaders who are accordingly dividing the country and transforming Lebanon to...

JZ: So the sectarianism is leading to the quota system? Everyone is taking their own share and that's why we got here?

RM: Everyone is taking their own share and in the same time when they are corrupt and from a certain sect, the other sects cannot reach them (hold them accountable) unless their own sect lifts the political cover (political immunity) over them.

JZ: What is the reason to why we got to this system, which has become a corrupt system and all countries acknowledge this issue, we have ranked the 3rd most corrupt country in the world?

Nabil Moukaddem (Sunni): I think the main problem we have is the sectarian distribution. Our main and first problem is our election system. I want to talk a little bit about our election system. I think if we make a new and modern electoral system and we get rid of sectarianism, we are able to solve a big part of the problem. I think, today, the question asked is, after a couple of months we will be having parliamentary elections if everything goes smoothly supposedly. We are still today prisoners of laws and legislations that are so far from...

JZ: The 60's Law [*Election Law*] is being discussed today.

NM: Yes true...that are so far from the spirit and progress. The question that we want to ask is: Until when are we going to keep digging out worn out and silly laws and until when is Lebanon going to keep perpetuating this sectarian system. I want to tell you something. The process of dismantling sectarianism, just so we are not very hopeful, doesn't come from changing only the electoral text. It is a long-term educational process. It starts from history books, starts from the way we raise our kids, a number of things, but an electoral law is one of the examples. Lebanon today is susceptible to explode at any second. [*unclear*] That is why if we do not have an established national unity, we are susceptible to things escalating at any second as a result to certain regional factors. These guys know it better than I do.

JZ: But the Lebanese society is finding the problem elsewhere. It is finding that if there is no cooperation currently between 2 very big sects, which are the Sunni and the Shia, I can't imagine that we can agree on an electoral law or a transparent judiciary system.

Mohammad Abdullah (Sunni): After we called it the Cedar Revolution in 2005, the big phenomenon that we witnessed in Martyr's Square, we saw that the hunkering down came back over a certain political period. Until there was a major crisis in Lebanon that unified all of Lebanon, that is the garbage crisis that generated another phenomenon: everyone, the Sunni, the Shiaa, the Christian, and other religions went

down to the streets for a certain cause. But we know that regardless of the size of movement in Lebanon, we know that sectarianism leads to no results. When the garbage crisis happened and what we call the civic movement, which I participated in, sectarianism came in to break down this collective. You are going today to the streets because you saw that the garbage is at your doorstep, but when it became such that my leader or your leader or his leader are supposed to take action and responsibility, there was a smart political move, if you may, from the leaders of the sects to dismantle this gathering...

JZ: You are confirming that the citizen is unable to abandon sectarianism for the sake of his leader even over a very important issue such as the garbage crisis.

MA: The citizen did abandon it, and he protested in the streets. However, afterwards, there was work done to dismantle this movement because they united, then they became factions again and politics entered with its divisional, confessional, and sectarian methodology and led to a division and inability to arrive at a conclusion.

Radwan Aqil (Shia): Starting from what my colleagues have talked about, we don't live in a normal country. For example, if Lebanon were to play a soccer game with any foreign country, we wouldn't find all the Lebanese people. While we find the Iranian people all as one, in a soccer game for example, the same with Egypt, we live in a state of sectarianism, as soon we mention the name of the street, we know the political affiliation of the street and the area. Let's admit it, if today we want to go buy a house from a person from another sect, it hasn't been that easy to do it and its very well known. Today there is a percentage, but this doesn't mean...

JZ: It has to be 10% Sunni in a certain building...

RA: But this doesn't mean that the relationships in the country between people is really that bad. No! On the contrary, we still have communities in universities and institutions etc. But I, as a journalist, I say we do not live normally in a normal country. To go back to the Sunni/Shia conversations, which has been brought up a lot. I don't want to say it's a disagreement; it's a contrast that goes back 1400 years and unfortunately is still until today used to bring up a conflict. Let's also admit that in the last 10 years the marriage between the Sunni and Shia has decreased, before it hasn't been this bad. I want to talk a little bit about the Shia movement. In the civil war, the Shia movement was a container for the National Movement led by Kamal Jounblat. It wasn't lead by a Shia leader although there were a lot of Shia leaders. Lately there has been a lot of talk about the conflict, I just want to say, today, there is a Sunni in Tripoli who doesn't know Tyre, and there is a Shia in Tyre who doesn't know Tarii Ljdideh and doesn't know Tripoli.

JZ: They don't know or they're not letting them know?

RA: We all take responsibility as press, as political powers, as parties, and sects. And because they are scared. Imagine this happens in this small country. Lets go back to the problem, which is that once someone is born, his confession follows him from birth to the grave. And today, let us admit it, Wasta is killing us. Wherever it is: in getting a degree, a job, etc. The Sunni-Shia conflict also made us think about the region with the Gulf countries and the Arab countries and how it affects this region. Otherwise, we as Sunni and Shia in this country, we lived together. Shia, still until today, Jamal Abdel Naser pictures are put up in Shia houses. Our sectarian system, the quota system, and sectarianism are pushing for continuation of this conflict. Also in

this country, there is no nationality. For example, why are the quotas calculated for the biggest sects: Maronites, Otrthodox, Shia, Sunna, and the Druze have no right to be represented. If Einstein were Druze he wouldn't be allowed to run the ministry of foreign affairs. Kamal Jounblat ran the Ministry of interior and he was amongst the best ministers. Prince Majeed Erslen ran the Ministry of Defense. Today everything is constrained and there is injustice even within the same sect.

RM: So we have the option: we either agree to rebuild the country on the right fundamentals and I agree that we cannot do this before we transcend sectarianism in our Electoral Law, because the big figures with the influence to change things, are benefiting from the current situation.

JZ: we are talking about benefits between the sects today.

RM: True because and there is another issue in the sectarian realm if we can say. When the youth want to apply for the military, or the judiciary school, or any job, they first need to go to the alleged leader of their sect so he can work it out for them. And they can't make him angry because he controls what they do for a living. He is the one who guarantees whether they are accepted or not.

JZ: Where is the Lebanese society going and if there is an opportunity to fix this sectarian system or the elections, how far can we go as you see it as Lebanese citizens, not as journalists? As a Lebanese citizen Radwan, where are we headed?

RM: When someone knows what his or her problem is, that is half of the treatment. At least we know that we have a problem, and we know that sectarianism is a problem, and we know that if we don't agree to sit together and actually sit together to discuss and plan a common future that is good for everyone, we won't be able to succeed. And it seems that in all the sects, all the Lebanese people, educated or not, know that this is the problem.

NM: I want to stress on one thing about the word "peoples". We are one unified peoples with unified goals and benefits, there are political and sectarian disagreements, yes, but it can be fixed even if it's very difficult at times. There is still in inter-religious marriage in Lebanon, this also a very important thing. Even the Lebanese people, in their nature, are peaceful not violent. Of course in the Civil war there were people from all sects that held weapons and fought, but the majority was expressing their opinion verbally, the percentage that held weapons and killed people depending on religion is small relative to the rest of the Lebanese people. Even the people who forced the migration of others, they are minority in their sects. If you are thorough in checking, you will see that in every sect the majority refuses these actions and practices and the evidence is that after the war the harmony, more or less, resurfaced again.

JZ: So we are confirming that the Lebanese people are not sectarian in nature.

NM: The Lebanese people are not sectarian. They are creative people who love life but the only problem is that they are constrained by sectarian laws after the false independence in 1943. The Lebanese people need to look after their benefits. As my colleagues were saying, if you want to put your child in schools or get a job, you need to go back to your sect's political reference and leader. I, as a Lebanese person today, they are saying they are forming a government, why do I care if it is all Muslims or all Christians if the members are qualified and are able to perform their tasks, why do I

care if they are 30 Muslims and 30 Christians as long as they are providing me good service and look after me. If they are all Orthodox, why do I care?

RA: It is your right to be with a political leader and you have the right to support him/her, but regardless, this leader today can deprive you from [*unclear word*]. Be open to the other and marry whomever you want. Hopefully, that with the new generation we are able to reach real nationalism that Hussein Fadl-Allāh and Gregoire Haddad used to talk about, and hopefully we think about what we are leaving our children and grandchildren in this country.

JZ: Thank you. I want to conclude now about how much we are connected to this country, which is why we are staying and I imagine that the Lebanese youth who is participating in the streets and in university elections is insisting to stay with good values. I think we started the conversation with Sunni-Shia conflict and ended with Gregoire Haddad and Sir Fadl-Allāh, we arrived at the conclusion that we are sitting together on one table with one hope that hopefully hopefully hopefully in a new era or an era in the future because I have hope in the youth as you said Radwan, the coming generations that are raised on these values and that what we witness over the past 40 years isn't going to get us anywhere.

APPENDIX E: EXPERT VIDEO FILE (Arabic)

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/xl5pimnqhxdqhj/FINAL%20VIDEO.avi?dl=0>

APPENDIX F: GUIDANCE QUESTIONS FOR MODERATORS FOR GROUP DISCUSSIONS (English)

Introduction:

With regards to the general direction and tenor of the discussion, it is very important that the message that comes out strongly and consistently is that intersectorian cooperation is good and desirable. It is also vital that by way of illustrating their arguments participants use plenty of examples. Abstract arguments can be difficult to grasp, and our aim is to ensure that participants understand how the lack of intersectorian cooperation makes the lives of ordinary people worse and how their lives could be made better if there was a greater amount of intersectorian cooperation. The issues that could be used as examples of why intersectorian cooperation is bad for everyday life include (but are not limited to): garbage collection in Beirut in August 2015, political corruption, institutional sclerosis, insecurity and inefficiency facilitated by the rigid quota system, lack of political accountability among politicians because of the widespread practice of vote buying. In other words, one of the key messages of this discussion should be that lack of intersectorian cooperation is not just some abstract issue that affects only the political elites, but that this issue has direct bearing on ordinary people's daily lives. Likewise, if possible, we would like participants to stress that problems of sectarianism begin with ordinary people (segregationist behavior, petty hatreds, etc.) and is not something that exists only at elite level. Thus, the change in attitudes and behavior must start in one daily's life and not just be initiated at the apex of society. Finally, because there are no Christians in the study, we would like the experts to focus as much as possible on intersectorian relations between the Shi'a and Sunni (of course, it is important to also mention the Christians, but we would prefer the bulk of the discussion to focus on Sunni-Shi'a relations).

In short, the most important guidelines are as follows:

- Use plenty of examples to illustrate arguments. Try to stay away from complex abstract concepts.
- Try to make the arguments relatable to everyday lives of ordinary people instead of focusing exclusively on political elites and dynamics in parliament and government.
- Insofar as possible, focus specifically on Sunni-Shi'a relations.

Some Draft Questions for Discussion Moderator:

1. What are the biggest problems in Lebanese political life at this time?
2. Would you say that there is sufficient cooperation across the sectarian lines among the political elites in parliament and elsewhere?
3. In your opinion, what are the reasons why the situation is currently as it is?
4. Many people feel that lack of cross-sectarian cooperation among the Sunni and Shia'a specifically is one of the biggest problems in contemporary Lebanon. Would you agree or not?
5. Specifically, and thinking very practically about our daily lives and provision of basic services, what types of problems arise as a result of this lack of inter-sectarian cooperation?

6. Thinking about Lebanon's long-term future, what are our country's prospects if the various religious sects, but especially the Sunni and the Shia'a, do not learn how to cooperate?
7. Do you think Lebanon as a whole would benefit if there was more cooperation between the Sunni and the Shia'a? What would be the benefits of such increased cooperation?
8. In your opinion, what would it take to increase the level of cooperation across the sectarian lines? Can ordinary people help change the situation for the better or does this have to be an elite project?

APPENDIX G: TRANSCRIPTS OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS (English) – A
Selection [Full set of transcripts available here:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/cm04pf07wgsgv74/AAAvGpkkSCsUgVX_wSGR2d45a?dl=0
]

Session 11, Table D

- *This discussion group has the **highest** discussion score among the 19 groups.*
- *Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as “unidentified”.*

Moderator: We are Session 11 Table D. Welcome. After we saw the 30 min video, there were a lot of topics discussed: How can there be cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects? They talked about this problem as a historical problem. Some talked about the judiciary system and the problems with this system. Someone also traced back the problems in Lebanon to the electoral law. The political parties and sectarian parties were also mentioned in details. Was the video clear to everyone? And first, do you agree with everything that was said in the video?

73: Not everything.

Moderator: You do not agree on everything.

Unidentified: Same.

Unidentified: Me too.

Moderator: Ok. What are the specific things said that are beneficial in your opinion? Or the ideas that you support in this discussion.

72: I support one of the ideas someone suggested about the necessity of cooperation between sects. In principle, they are mostly talking about Sunni-Shia. As he said it is necessary to have cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects, but some people suggested ways of cooperation that are rejected. It doesn't mean that if we have civil marriage then we've cooperated. Some religions forbid civil marriage from a religious point of view not legislative one. But we support what they said about the issue of renting houses and the issue of education and the necessity to raise our kids from a young age that the Sunni is their brother and the Shia is their brother and the Christian is their brother and that they are all the same. We shouldn't be raising them that certain areas have certain sectarian affiliations. We were also raised on this perspective. We'd be in the car with our parents and we get to a specific area...

Unidentified: “oh this is Tariq Jdide”

72: Tariq Jdide for example, we'd directly ask, “oh dad, whose is this area?” ”This area is not with us, they are all against us.” That is wrong.

72: We should teach them that this is all Lebanon.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Sir, what did you object about?

73: I objected about the Parliamentary elections and about the idea that the delegates can be anyone. They are saying if the delegates are all Sunni or all Christians...

Moderator: But as long as they are good, if they are all Christian then where is the problem?

Unidentified: If they all serve the country, where is the problem?

73: No this is wrong.

Moderator: It's wrong. They need to be divided.

73: They need to be divided. Because as we all know, the country is divided.

Moderator: He talked about the sectarian politics and the quotas system. Sometimes the wrong or bad person fills a position just because they need to fill it with someone from a certain sect.

73: Yes but the country is divided, and this is known.

Moderator: So it is still better to divide it over all the sects.

73: Yes, of course.

Moderator: Who among the speakers was the most convincing in your opinion?

71: The one who was talking about the elections and how the candidates should be from all sects not limited to one sect. He even talked with respect to Druze, Muslims, and Christians. And regarding whether or not the country is divided, after it was divided in 1970's and 1980's, it honestly never went back to how it was and it has just been worsening. As the guy here said that every generation is teaching its children that these people are X and these follow X and those follow Y. So it was divided and it has only been in decline.

Unidentified: To the worse.

71: We want to work against this flow that the rising youth is following. And it is very unfortunate that the ministers and rulers support everyone who supports their sects and follow them. Although, we want leaders and rulers to work with all sects and solve the problem from the roots.

73: Why are they focused on Sunni-Shia only?

69: The study is just about Sunni-Shia.

71: Because it is the most intense.

Unidentified: Sunni-Shia is the more prevalent.

Moderator: Sir, after watching the video and in your opinion, is the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia the reason behind all these problems?

69: No, its reason is the lack of love for the country and citizenship as they say because that is fundamental. The Sunni is Sunni and the Shia is Shia, to each his/her own personal life, but they should talk about patriotism. Patriotism is fundamental to raise a good society that doesn't think about its sects but rather about Lebanon, the country, and the civic society. This is the basis. Three quarters of what they were saying was about sects. They didn't talk about the country and patriotism.

Moderator: So if we switch the rhetoric to talk about how this cooperation can serve the national interest, do you think this cooperation will affect the political, economical, and societal situation as a whole?

69: Of course. Everything changes. The citizen will be psychologically relieved.

73: Why can't the country be for all sects and not necessarily the Sunni and Shia sects? We are a diverse country and we have many sects.

Moderator: So your opinion is that it is not just about limiting the cooperation between the Sunni and Shia?

73: Yes, cooperate with everyone. It doesn't have to become Sunni-Shia. In the end of the day, both Sunni and Shia are Muslims. The same Qur'an.

Unidentified: Same Qur'an.

72: But we need to pay attention that when she addressed the questions, she addressed them based on a Sunni-Shia rhetoric because the aim of the study is explore the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

Moderator: Yes that is the aim of the study but his opinion is that the problem is not just a Sunni-Shia one.

72: Oh ok.

73: Yes as a whole. Lebanon as a whole, we want to live together.

71: We want to live together.

Moderator: In your opinion and from what you saw in the video, what are the barriers that stand in the way of the cooperation between sects and specifically between Sunni and Shia sects?

74: Just like she said that we raise our kids on how this area is ours and that area is not ours and this is Sunni and that is Shia. Please repeat the question, I forget.

Moderator: So in your opinion, are these reasons that prevent the cooperation between these two sects?

74: Yes of course. And the leaders who give incitement speeches and that religion and politics should not mix in the government. Even as someone here said, they go on podiums during Friday prayers and they talk about politics. You are here to talk about religion, what does politics have anything to do with this?

Moderator: So clerics...

74: Should stick to religion.

Moderator: affect this cooperation negatively?

74: Yes, yes.

71: Yes.

73: There needs to be a separation between clerics and politics. It is necessary.

71: Yes.

74: If I go to the mosque to pray, I want to hear a religious talk that I can understand. I can watch the news to know about politics.

Moderator: Go ahead.

70: I want to say something. Why don't we unite like we united once for the garbage crisis and at some point they managed to break us apart?

Moderator: Why?

70: They started sending infiltrators to vandalize and beat people. In the end, we are all Muslims, whether Sunni or Shia, we cannot abandon each other. It is absolutely impossible for these two sects to abandon each other because there are a lot of Sunni married to Shia and vice versa.

Unidentified: Me.

70: What are the sects of the children of mixed parents then? Sunni or Shia? His mom is Shia and his dad is Sunni. We need to get rid of these things and distinctions between Sunni and Shia. I liked the idea of eliminating the sect from the ID cards.

73: Yes the sect.

70: So that the person taking your ID card at a checkpoint, he might be Shia and sees you are Sunni, so he might start showing off and act superior to you. The first step in order to fix the country, we need to get rid of the...

73: sect.

74: sect.

70: the sect from ID cards. When that happens, no one will know who is what.

74: True.

Moderator: The sect is also on the Personal Status Record.

70: The sect should be taken off the ID cards and the Personal Status Records. We need to get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

74: You can tell from the names though.

70: I am from the south and I live in the middle Tariq Jdide. If I am sitting in a group of people and I say my last name they get surprised and they start winking at each other. Why would you do that? You've known me for a while now! I live with you and I have Sunni kids. Why are you discriminating? If I discriminate I wouldn't have married one of you and my husband wouldn't have married me. And I speak Beirut more than they do. Why do they discriminate? There is discrimination from my sect and from the Sunni sect as well, I am not saying one or the other.

73: Both sects the same.

70: We need to get rid of this idea of labeling Sunni or Shia. Eliminate it on the ID cards as well. It starts with the ID cards and once your sect is erased, everything gets erased.

71: We wish.

70: It will unite all the Muslims and we won't have this Sunni-Shia issue.

Moderator: The madam gave a reason on why she thinks there is a lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia in the society. Can you give us another example that proves the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia? From your daily life.

71: I'm going to tell you a story about something that happened with a friend of mine. Her daughter went to apply somewhere. Her last name is not very clear to what her sect is and whether she is Sunni or Shia. They accepted her and everything and told her to bring her ID card. After showing them her ID he asked her if she was from X city. His face turned yellow and told her that we will contact you later after he had confirmed with her and everything. These stories about the hatred between Sunni and Shia in general, of course there are a lot of people from both sects who love each other, have become serious and the problem is so complicated and it is very difficult to be resolved. From what I see there is a Sunni-Shia problem and it is just as prevalent among the youth as it is among the elders. It has become a very difficult problem, but we hope that it gets resolved somehow.

70: By the way, the new rising generation will eliminate the idea of Sunni-Shia because while our grandparents still hold grudges and hatred from the civil war, the new generation is going to be more aware. It will not care about the Sunni and Shia labels because the Lebanese economy is on decline and we are the reason behind that due to our backwards mentality. It shouldn't be about Sunni or Shia. We are all Muslims and we all have the Qur'an. Why don't we say that? Why do we discriminate between Sunni and Shia when half of our children are Sunni and the other half is Shia? Why? For example if someone from Tariq Jdide went to Barboor (*Predominantly Shia*) they start winking to let each other know that he's from Tariq Jdide. And it the same thing the other way around. Why?

74: They'd beat him.

70: Why? You are his friend! Why are you acting like this? The main reason is that the big important figures squeezed this idea into the regular people's heads. I hope that

any mother and any father would take this idea of Sunni-Shia out of their heads and the head of any child.

73: This has to be done through clerics.

Unidentified: Clerics and leaders.

73: No just clerics.

72: We also need to shed light that clerics and political leaders are not the only ones to blame. I will give an example from both sects. First, the Sunni religion prohibits cursing any faith and they say that our without Ali, prophet Omar would've perished (*Ali being Shia and Omar being Sunni*). In the same time, the big religious Shia references such as Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and Sayyed Ali Khamenei, they absolutely prohibit cursing any (*unclear word*).

70: Yes.

74: It still happens though.

72: Any ignorant Sunni or Shia guy, not an educated one, curses X or Y to their friends. By that, he is provoking the other side. As a Sunni or Shia guy, if I hear someone cursing Imam Ali or Omar, I will inevitably react.

73: True.

70: You will feel something.

74: Yes.

72: So the youth's ignorance is what got us here not the politicians at all.

73: I was just saying that.

72: Because we cannot just blame clerics and politicians.

73: On the contrary, this is the cleric's business.

74: No as he said, it is these ignorant people on the streets.

73: Clerics need to raise awareness among the youth.

Moderator: He said in the video that in the internal circles, the clerics' speeches are going to be sectarian.

70: Yes exactly, sectarian.

73: Why can't it be unifying? All the clerics need to unite...

Moderator: So you think there is a responsibility on clerics?

73: Of course.

70: Any cleric that goes on TV needs to promote love between Muslims and not use the Sunni and Shia labels but instead use Muslims.

73: Sayyed Mohammad Hussein used to talk about the Islamic unity.

Moderator: I want to hear your opinion on this, the absence of cooperation and its reasons, and how we can solve it.

69: The main reasons lies in the civic society. We were divided because of our clerics and because of our leaders. They constructed their own schools like Al Maqased or (*unclear*).

74: Al Masharee'.

69: And that was the beginning of the Sunni-Shia division in this country. On this principle, they started teaching religion in their own ways. Whether Sunni or Shia, they founded sectarianism. And sectarianism, as I told you, does not end except if with our love and commitment to the country. That is fundamental because if we keep thinking Sunni-Shia or Christian-Druze we will not be able to make it.

74: I swear; before they used to all marry each other.

69: They need to unify the schoolbooks and not allow schools to teach its own thing so that they can feed into sectarianism.

Moderator: Do you think that someone ordinary like you can contribute in enhancing this cooperation?

69: He can contribute through his family. He can contribute through his neighbor if he trusts them. He can make a change but very slightly. The main contribution needs to come from the leaders and clerics. They are the ones who need to make a change.

74: For example, I am Sunni and you are Sunni and you are Shia and we are really good friends. But if my Shia neighbor or Sunni neighbor interferes, my friend turns against me.

70: Yes.

Moderator: This happens?

74: Yes, I hear them. We would be sitting together and all is well but when someone from her sect joins, she just becomes aggressive.

70: That's our problem. We become sectarian.

74: I have been married twice: one was Sunni and one was Shia. I have Sunni and Shia kids.

73: Nice.

74: Both of them are with me and they do not know he is Sunni or he is Shia, they just know that they are Muslims.

70: I lived in an area where no one knew where I was from. And everyone loved me. When they knew where I was from they said, "We wish they are all like you." I do not involve myself in politics. I tell them if either of you, Shia or Sunni, wants to talk politics you have to respect each other. They ask me where I'm from; I say I'm Muslim. It is not your business.

74: I have a Shia neighbor whom I didn't know was Shia. We used to laugh and joke about things and even Sunni and Shia tease each other. In the end I learned that she was Shia and she never showed it.

Moderator: The video discussed that the judiciary is a problem and the electoral law is a problem. And someone considered the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party are actual political parties because they include people from different sects while other parties are sectarian parties because they are not represented by all the sects.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Which topic convinced you most? The one about the judiciary, the electoral law, or the talk about political and sectarian parties?

74: The political parties and sectarianism. Because these are the ones who ruined the country.

70: True, same. A whole sect follows certain parties.

71: Yes, political parties and sectarianism. If we resolve the sectarianism problem, everything will be resolved.

70: If they get rid of all parties, Lebanon will become a great country again.

Moderator: Get rid of sectarian parties?

70: Yes sectarian ones.

71: Yes.

Moderator: So you agree that in Lebanon there are political parties represented by different sects and there are sectarian parties?

70: Yes of course.

Unidentified: They should make a shared party.

70: They should found parties to unite all the Muslims together. Why does the Lebanese Army indulge in sectarianism? Because it is part of their training and teachings not to be sectarian.

Moderator: I asked a question: if we achieve this cooperation, does it affect the economy and political and social situations? Give me examples.

74: Yes, they start to like each other.

71: Of course!

70: The Shia will start employing the Sunni and the Sunni will start employing the Shia.

74: True.

70: You'll stop needing a Wasta to find an opportunity or employment. And the same goes for the Sunni.

73: the regions mix.

70: Finding a job then just becomes about competency and degrees not about Wasta.

Moderator: On the societal level, you think that will create some sort of familiarity between the citizens?

73: Of course. Someone from Tripoli wouldn't go to Dahyeh.

70: True.

71: That's what I wanted to say.

73: Or take someone from Dahyeh to Tripoli... last time there were fights and people beat each other.

71: That's too bad, Lebanon is for everyone not for certain sects.

73: The whole country would just freshen up. Dahyeh freshens up, Beirut freshens up, Tripoli freshens up... There'd be communication between the citizens.

Moderator: How would the cooperation affect the political situation?

70: The politicians will start liking each other.

69: You witness how that helped the political atmosphere.

Moderator: how they recently were all in agreement?

73: Yes.

69: In agreement but it is all about personal interests. When the parliamentary system is changed and when the electoral law is changed, then you'll have a hope to build something for the future. But while they are sticking with these outdated laws, nothing is going to change.

Moderator: So you are focusing on the electoral as the basis?

69: Of course.

Moderator: Do you consider that it is part of solving the problem and it is not just about the text because there are a lot of reasons that can lead to the absence of cooperation?

69: But the majority of it is about the electoral law. Three quarters of our problems are because of the law. When the law enforces that only Sunni can occupy this position and only Shia can occupy that position, then it is dividing between Sunni and Shia.

72: I just want to say that legislatively, the president shouldn't be Christian. They made it this way based on customs.

71: It was imposed on us.

73: That is the Lebanese constitution.

72: Legally, the Prime Minister, or the Chairman of the House of Representatives, or the President of the Republic is not limited to one sect. Legally that is.

73: Our constitution says that.

72: No, legally it is not. That is just customs.

71: This law was set by the French colonialists.

Moderator: But what is the origin of these customs? Al Taif Agreement.

72: Yes.

Moderator: Al Taif Agreement is the constitution of this country.

72: But I am saying that the Lebanese law does not specify sectarian requirements for certain positions. If our politicians follow the Lebanese Law properly, we'd get rid of sectarianism in politics.

73: Yes you mean eliminating sectarian politics.

72: But everyone has their own law tailored to fit their needs. If the politicians follow the proper Lebanese law, it is a good law. But each of them wants to customize their own laws. They were the ones to specify that the Prime Minister is Shia and Chairman of the House of Representatives is Sunni...But legally, this law doesn't exist.

Moderator: Now I want you to think about what kind of societies your children will live in 20-30 years from today. Will they live in a society that actually has cooperation or is it going to be the same society we live in today? How do you imagine their society would look like?

70: Same society. Let me tell you something. The Sunni-Shia issue might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years it will spark again.

74: True.

71: In my opinion, it is not going to disappear to start with.

70: No matter how much it disappears, a day will come when one of the leaders will need something and will need to exploit this country and its weakest point, which is the Sunni-Shia conflict, so he will incite the people and walk away.

72: I'm going to say it again: if the politicians start eliminating sectarianism from the top, and treating everyone equally where all of Lebanon is for us regardless of which area, and get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric even on the ID cards, I think we can improve bit by bit and this issue will be over.

73: I have hope that things will change.

Moderator: Is there hope?

73: Yes.

Moderator: Is there something that we should do for our children so that such change can happen in the future?

73: Of course! We need to put in a big effort, and there should be civic activities mainly to distance clerics from politics.

74: Yes.

69: There is no change.

Moderator: You think it will stay like this?

69: As it is.

70: It might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years but one day a leader will want something and will create a conflict, which is the easiest thing to do in Lebanon because we have

birds-brains. If someone curses Omar go beat him and if someone curses the Hussein go beat him. That's how it works here.

73: That is wrong.

70: Just so that the leaders can exploit his position so that they can benefit on our children's sake.

74: We need a leader whose mom is Shia and dad is Sunni or otherwise so that they wouldn't dare marginalize either group.

73: We are still doing the same mistakes and our clerics are wrong. The speeches are wrong, Friday speeches are wrong, everything is wrong whether in this sect or that one.

70: Who told you though that Shia don't love the Sunni or the Sunni don't love the Shia.

Moderator: there is love.

70: There is love.

74: But it is subtle.

71: We are talking in general. Of course there are some who love each other, but generally, the conflict is there.

74: I love my husband and my children.

70: No there is love. There is love.

Moderator: Ok we are end the discussion about the video now.

Session 6, Table D

- This discussion group has the **lowest** discussion score among the 19 groups.
- Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as “unidentified”.

Moderator: Welcome to Table D Session 6. After listening to the video and the topics that were discussed, I would like to start with those topics. First, do you agree with everything that was said in the video? Who would like to start?

73: What is being said is all about the situation we are living in. They are not adding anything more to what is really going on: sectarianism, quota system, job opportunities, ministers, House of Representatives... This is what is actually happening. Nothing is changing, whether it is in the Sunni sect or Shia sect or Christian sect or Druze sect, they all have a quota system. And the people are the ones paying. For example, X leader or minister has his own group and says, “No I’ll serve my group so that they can back me up in the elections, why would I serve the other sect?”

Moderator: His benefit is only in his sect.

73: his benefit is more important than anything. More important than the country to be honest. His priority is in his personal benefits more than it is in the benefits of the country. If the country meant anything to him, he wouldn’t have created this group around him so that it backs him with its votes. They’d say “I have nothing to do with the Mountain region or South region. I am from Beirut or the North or Biqaa. Every leader is controlling his sect and even if they approve of him or not, he says to them “who else are you going to vote for? To the Sunni or the Shia or the Christian?” That is what is happening.

69: The theory he is talking about is true. But also, you cannot say that the country is following this path. For example, you get a representative who you vote for but you don’t see him. This is called the complete lists where you just vote for everyone on the list.

73: True.

69: There are a lot of representatives who come and do not serve anyone, not even themselves. He sits in an office for a short while then he’s out.

74: Yes.

73: 100%.

73: This depends on the cluster and the person because I might want the people on this list to all make it. You don’t look at the individuals you just like the title of the group so you vote for all of them. That’s the wrong thing to do.

69: 100%.

71: Sometimes the names change. Sometimes someone from a sect other than your own serves you better than someone from your own sect.

72: True.

Moderator: And that was said in the video that sometimes better service comes from outside your sect. Is that happening?

71: Yes of course.

74: Yes.

72: What I liked about the video most is that we all united over the garbage crisis and we all protested: Sunni, Shia, and Christians. That was what united us. Other than that, unfortunately, everyone follows his or her own leader.

71: But generally, sectarianism was not as deeply rooted.

69: True true. We used to live as one, we didn't use to think X is Shia, Y is Sunni, Z is Christian. You might find a better friend from another sect than your own.

74: They also even said that if someone is Shia he couldn't go to Tripoli, why not?

71: yea why not?

74: That he fears that he'd be killed because they are not from the same sect as him. All of this also...

71: This recently started happening.

74: Yes.

69: But if you look back at the wars in 1975 and 1981 and the elimination war, there wasn't this Sunni-Shia rhetoric. Yes sure we passed through a Muslim-Christian period during the elimination war, but the Sunni-Shia thing only started after the 1996.

74: True.

71: Absolutely true.

69: That we only witness after 1996. If you want to look at us, the people present in this room, we lived half of our lives 1996, 1997, 1998 and we still live normally, then someone introduced this conflict. Of course nothing happens out of nothing, as they say "there is no smoke without a fire."

74: Of course.

69: They introduced this conflict for political and divisional reasons.

74: True.

71: It serves their purposes.

Moderator: And sectarianism furthered this.

69: Of course.

Moderator: It is a tool.

69: Exactly.

72: And since they assassinated the martyr Rafic Al Hariri, these things started happening.

74: That's true.

71: True.

72: They got what they wanted.

Moderator: By assassinating the martyr Rafic Al Hariri?

72: Yes.

74: Yes, this never used to show before.

71: Yes.

Moderator: I want to hear your voice now. Do you agree about most things said in the video? First I want to ask you, are we one people or multiple peoples? So are we just sects or do we truly belong to one Lebanese people.

74: Sects

Unidentified: Sects, and very much so.

71: No but our belonging is to Lebanon if you want the truth.

73: The truth is that we are 18 sects.

71: Even if 20 sects, but who do we belong to?

73: To our leaders.

Moderator: In their opinion, we are more sectarian than we are nationalistic.

71: True, but in the end our belonging is to our country.

73: They only agree with each other when they are abroad and they love Lebanon.

71: No here too.

72: Yes.

74: True.

73: You see a Lebanese abroad, you love him but when you're in Lebanon...

71: True.

73: you got into a hospital for example, you see someone and you start thinking, "they are from my sect so they will do me more favors than someone from another sect."

Unidentified: In hospitals, they are all the same.

74: We are saying that even sometimes people in our own sect don't help us, so we have to go to another sect to get help.

71: True.

73: There is something we need to pay attention to is that, true we have sects but for example, if you are not affiliated with a specific leader or political party you find that you won't get as much help. That is the idea. Even religious figures do not cooperate to unite a certain sect.

74: True.

72: True.

71: True.

73: They've done this so that they can create this sort of an army. The Lebanese people are people who love life and fun in life. They made them poor.

Moderator: So you stress that the people in Lebanon are not sectarian but they love life.

73: 100%. But they are exploiting that you are poor.

74: True.

69: Take for example the events that happened on the 7th of May and other events; it was all about money. Who sent protesters to the streets other than those who have money? They paid them \$500.

73: They are after the poor people. There are no jobs so they pushed you to follow political parties. The day I get a job I won't care about weapons. If I cannot support myself, I have to follow them so that I can survive. That's the point.

74: True.

69: From 2000 until the end of 2004, it was the best 4 years ever. After 2005...

73: Because people were busy with work. Now you sit at home and you bring it out on your family because there is nothing that is distracting you.

69: Yes, true. Before 2005 everyone was working and no one had time for anything. Now you find yourself without work, you go to your relative's place and you start fighting. Unemployment makes problems.

74: True.

71: And generally, one person cannot support the family.

74: Of course, one hand doesn't clap.

73: Even if you notice, in every house the dad is married to either a Sunni or Shia women. There is no mixing. There are slogans and things they say in schools that are wrong. The government wants this disorder.

69: You've seen the extremists that we've been hearing about. Where do these people come from? From the education.

73: That is wrong education and wrong mentality.

69: Someone is teaching them to be like that. They're not born like that.

74: Someone is paying for them to become like that.

73: Lebanon is small and has 18 sects not like the countries around us that have 2 or 3 sects.

70: They plant the doctrine.

73: She is right.

69: Even words like doctrine, funding...These are words that the media started using only recently.

70: Yes these are new.

72: The media also plays a big role.

69: The media war is more important even than the actual war and influences a lot.

72: Even if there is nothing happening they start exaggerating things.

Moderator: In your opinion these problems that we have in Lebanon are the result of the lack of cooperation between sects specifically, Sunni-Shia?

70: Yes of course. If they were united we wouldn't have gotten here.

Moderator: Is it possible that if this cooperation happens, it can improve the social, political, and economical situation? And how can this cooperation be translated in your opinion?

70: When the big shots agree with each other, the ones below them follow.

72: True.

71: True.

72: Unfortunately, we are talking about people above and people below.

73: The big shots are agreeing not for the people, but for their own benefits.

74: Of course.

73: They are just playing roles like in a play.

69: If we go back a couple of months, it was chaos. The people who were shooting each other are now fine but those who died, it is now over for them.

72: Yes.

74: Yes.

69: Their worth has become nothing.

71: they can make us love each other and they can make us hate each other.

69: Any leader of any sect goes on TV and starts threatening. The country goes into chaos.

73: But why? If you are working and have money you wouldn't follow a leader, you can support yourself. But they have made the people poor so they keep following them.

74: Where can you find jobs anyway? There are no jobs.

73: Even if you find the ministers and leaders fighting with each other, it is not for us, it is because of their benefits. I'm sorry but we keep saying Lebanon was united over the garbage crisis, no it wasn't united. There was just portions to be divided between the Druze and Sunni sect.

- 74:** They united over the garbage crisis. Why don't we actually become all one hand in everything without caring about Druze sect or Sunni sect or Shia sect.
- 73:** I mean we united to get rid of the garbage and smell that is surrounding us. But if you actually listen to them speak, because...before 2005 or even now as they make the new quotas, the Druze sect was the most benefited because there was someone from the Sunni sect who was also involved and made a huge deal about it (*negatively*). Because the people of X or not the people of Y are going to benefit, they agitate the citizens whenever they want. Just like in the civic movement. There were a lot of people who had a benefit in it. When they found that it was getting risky they sent their forces to beat people up.
- 74:** True.
- 71:** True.
- 73:** Even there were officers who talked. The government is the base. For example, I as Shia, or Sunni or Druze and you as Shia you want to take 4 officers, Sunni 4 officers, Druze 2 officers and Christians 3 officers. This is our law. Even first class officers are Christians. They force it on you.
- 69:** True that is what is requested.
- Moderator:** So sectarianism is rooted in the law even.
- 74:** Yes.
- 73:** Exactly, they are forcing it on you.
- 69:** You are talking about the 60's law.
- Moderator:** Election Law then.
- 69 (12:50 – 13:08):** Yes, we are talking about a law that has been followed for a while. When they were done with all the benefits, they created sectarianism.
- 73:** True true.
- 69:** And if we manage to get rid of sectarianism, they'll create something else.
- 71:** They'll distract us with something else, true.
- 72:** They enforced this system. House of Representatives is for Shia, the head of government is for Sunni's, president for Christians.
- 73:** True.
- Moderator:** is this something wrong in your opinion?
- 72:** In my opinion, if there is someone Sunni and he is qualified, I do not mind if he becomes president.
- 74:** But it is important that he provides us with what we want.
- 71:** This is an old law; they didn't set it up recently. It is since we got our independence. Because they were all united back then, so they divided and it's been like that since then.
- 73:** Yes, but they took away the authority from the president. In another words, he has no role, just a chair to be filled.
- Moderator (13:5:** So the parliament is for the Shia sect and the government is for the Sunni sect, which was since Al Taif in 1990 until today.
- 71:** True.
- 69:** Yes from 1975 until the 1990s we didn't have a country. After the 90's they set up Al Taif and we've been following it since.
- 71:** Yes that's it. It's a wrong law and we haven't changed it.

Moderator: Ok. In your opinion, what should be done to reinforce this cooperation? We talked about a lot of problems and the reasons behind this absence of cooperation. Now what should we do so that we create this cooperation? And let's try to be realistic in our answers.

71: If the people all come to an agreement...

73: But the people cannot come to an agreement if the big leaders don't resolve these issues. What is supposed to happen is...

69: Are we talking about predictions? Or something on the ground?

Moderator: No not predictions. On the ground, yes.

69: It is impossible.

73: Everything can be fixed in Lebanon today, but how? For example, there wasn't going to be a president. A couple of days before, they pushed for it and we got one. Everything will work if you want it to happen.

71: True.

Moderator: Ok. People like you, do you think you are capable of making a changing that can lead to more cooperation? You as ordinary people, you don't think you play a role?

74: No no.

73: No we don't have an influence.

71: Of course not.

69: No. In dreams maybe.

73: When the civic movement happened, we supported them thinking that they were doing something for the better. Turned out people involved in it were politicized and political parties pushed them to talk in certain ways. It was revealed in the end. This one is affiliated with X and that one is affiliated with Y. They identified them in pictures and names. You need to eliminate or fix the law of political parties in Lebanon. When this is resolved and we'll stop having political parties, you become just a Lebanese citizen without affiliations.

69: This is very difficult.

73: No we can get rid of political parties.

69: It is impossible.

69: Why did someone become a leader? Because of his group. Take away his support and he becomes just like anyone one of us.

73: My friend, yes but they'll become leaders because of their popularity not his political group. When you say "movement" or whatever, take out the word "parties" in the Lebanese law, you'll become just citizens...

69: Let me just give you this example. They told Wiaam Wahaab that they wanted to dismantle his United Party, so he made it the United Movement.

73: No just dismantle all parties in the law. You can still love your leader but not under a specific party.

69: It won't work.

73: Why not!

Moderator: In your opinion, if we want to think about our children and as youth, in our future. Do you think we're going to be living in a similar society as the one we are living in today or maybe it'll be better?

69: 100%. It will not change.

72: Of course. It'll be the same.

74: Depends on our optimism.

73: If you want Ziad El Rahbani plays (*satirical plays that discussed the political and social problems in Lebanon*) they are still the same reality. What our parents watched and laughed about, we can still relate to and laugh about as well.

71: No hopefully everything changes. Nothing stays the same.

74: We just need to be hopeful.

69: The lady here. You've witnessed so many governments and ministries and it is still the same.

71: We used to live a more luxurious life. Older people know how it was. A man used to get 300,000 LBP and live like a king, now if he gets a million it's not enough.

74: yes true.

73: The economical situation is like that globally.

71: Yes, I'm telling you, it just might change again.

74: because back then you didn't pay TVA. They drown you. No you pay 10% of your salary, on the food you buy, on everything. In the end up of the day you find that you've paid 30-40% of your salary. There are policies that me and you don't know about.

71: I'm telling you everything changed. And you never know, maybe it'll change again one day.

Moderator: I want to thank you for this effective discussion.

APPENDIX H: ELECTION BROKERS SCRIPTS (English)

G-1. Sunni Broker

No clientelism:

“Hi, my name is Rabih. I want to check your records: Name, age, phone number, and region. These records are confidential and no one other than us sees it.

Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.

[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]

Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time.”

Clientelism:

“But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor because the Sunni candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you \$10 just to go in and vote for him. And this topic is a secret. No one can know about it. Thank you. You can go back to your table.”

G-2. Shia Broker

No clientelism:

“Hi, my name is Akram. I want to check your records: Name, age, telephone, and address. These records are secret, no one knows other than us sees it. Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.

[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]

Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time.”

Clientelism:

“But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor. The Shia candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you \$10 just to go in and vote for him. This is only between us. Thank you. You can go back to your table.”

APPENDIX I: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL THE GAMES (English)

1. DECISION TASK 1: SIMULATED ELECTIONS

We are now ready to begin the decision tasks. In the first task, you will have a chance to vote in simulated elections to decide how to divide some resources held in common. First, I will distribute 40 tokens to each of you. Then, 20 out of these 40 tokens will be taken away—think of it as a tax—and the resultant amount of 120 tokens will be placed in the center of the table. You will have a chance to decide how the 120 tokens in the common pool should be divided between the participants around your table. Specifically, we will ask you to vote in four simulated elections. Prior to each election two candidates will address your group and propose different ways to divide the 120 tokens. You will then have a chance to vote for a candidate whom you liked best by secretly recording your vote in writing. Remember that your decision affects how much money you will receive at the conclusion of the study. Your vote, just like all the decisions that you make later, must be completely confidential. Please cover your sheet and when you mark your choice make sure that no one sees it. After all the decision tasks are completed we will examine the results of just one of the four elections, for ease of calculation, and will implement the winning policy proposal to determine how many tokens each participant around our table will receive. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is \$10 and the maximum is \$30.

2. DECISION TASK 2: OTHER-OTHER ALLOCATION GAME

In this next task, you have to decide how to divide 10 tokens between two members of your group—one Sunni and one Shi'a. Only the organizers know which two members of your group will be affected by your decision, and you, yourself, are not one of the people affected. Your decision will not be made public. Please turn to the decision sheet for the second task in your packet. Out of 10 tokens, how many will you give to a Sunni at this table? And how many to a Shi'a? The table on the decision sheet details all the different ways of dividing 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shi'a. Please circle just one option that corresponds to your preference (in complete secret; shielding your decision sheet from others) and hand the decision sheet back to me. Somebody else's decision at this table will determine how much money you will receive; your compensation will be between \$0 and \$5. You will receive the payment once all the decision tasks are completed.

3. DECISION TASK 3: PUBLIC GOODS GAME

In this next task, you also receive 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 tokens to put into a common pool to be divided among all the participants. Once everyone has made their decision, the money in the common pool will be multiplied by two and divided equally among all the group members. Whatever tokens you do not put in the common pool are yours to keep. Your earnings then are whatever tokens you do not contribute to the common pool and the tokens that you receive once the common pool is divided among all members of the group.

Let us try this to see how the decision task works; these practice rounds do not count towards your earnings. [The table manager distributes ten tokens to every participant.] Imagine that no one contributes to the common pool; then everyone is left with their 10

tokens in earnings. Now, imagine that everyone contributes their whole amount to the common pool. [Table manager ensures that all participants put 10 tokens in the middle, adds another 60 tokens to the common pool, and returns 20 tokens to every participant.] Everyone receives 20 tokens back. In this final round, imagine that people around the table contribute 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 tokens. [The table manager ensures that these are the contributions made by participants; multiplies 30 by 2 [=60], adds 30 tokens to the common pool, and distributes 10 tokens back to every participant.]

Now we are ready to do this task properly. We will play the decision game for five rounds. At the beginning of every round you will start with just 10 tokens. We are not going to use actual tokens though; we would like you to write down how many of the 10 tokens you contribute towards the common pool in every round. You will write down your contributions towards the common pool for every round secretly, shielding your decision sheet from others, on a decision sheet that is in your packet. At the end of every round I will announce how many tokens every participant contributed without revealing anyone's identity; what the total contribution was; and how much every participant would receive from the common pool. After all the tasks are completed, we will calculate your actual earnings by picking one of the five rounds at random. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is \$2 and the maximum is \$13.

APPENDIX J: DECISION SHEETS (English)

I. Decision Task 1: simulated elections

Election #

Vote for your preferred candidate by placing a checkmark against his name (example: Candidate XXXXXXXX). You may only vote for ONE candidate.

Candidate XXXXXXXXX

Candidate YYYYYYYYYY

II. Decision Task 2: other-other allocation game

You have 10 tokens to distribute. You must distribute all 10 tokens. You cannot know whom specifically the tokens will go to, and you yourself are not a recipient.

Each row in the table below shows a different way to divide 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shia. From the options below please decide how many tokens you will give to another member of YOUR OWN RELIGIOUS SECT at this table and how many will go to the member of the different religious sect at the table. Circle your ONE preferred option in the last row.

Option	Token allocation										
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)
TO A SUNNI	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
TO A SHIA	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
CIRCLE ONE PREFERRED OPTION	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)

III. Decision Task 3: Public Goods Game

You have 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 to put in the common pool and how many to keep for yourself. All tokens in the common pool will be multiplied by two and shared EQUALLY among everyone at this table. The tokens that you do not put in the common pool you can keep for yourself as earnings.

Of the 10 tokens, how many will you put in the common pool? (The remainder will automatically be set aside for you as earnings).

	FOR THE COMMON POOL ONLY (enter a number of tokens between 0 and 10)
ROUND XX:	

APPENDIX K: SCRIPT DELIVERED BY ELECTION CANDIDATES (English)

Election 1:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, only the Shi'a at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Shi'a, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 2:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, only the Sunni at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Sunni, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 3:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, the Shi'a and Sunni at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Shi'a will receive 30 tokens and each Sunni will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 4:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, the Sunni and Shi'a at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Sunni will receive 30 tokens and each Shi'a will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

APPENDIX L: RANDOMIZATION CHECK

Understanding of the task

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 2.70	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 56 Observations; mean 2.68	0.20	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 55 Observations; mean 2.62	0.74	0.53	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 58 Observations; mean 2.66	0.42	0.21	-0.32	×	×	×
Condition 5 57 Observations; mean 2.63	0.63	0.42	-0.11	0.21	×	×
Condition 6 57 Observations; mean 2.56	1.26	1.03	0.48	0.81	0.60	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Age

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 37.17	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 38.60	-0.57	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 35.42	0.77	1.31	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 37.95	-0.33	0.26	-1.11	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 37.02	0.06	0.63	-0.70	0.40	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 36.57	0.25	0.79	-0.49	0.57	0.19	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Education

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 58 Observations; mean 3.79	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 59 Observations; mean 3.51	1.09	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 58 Observations; mean 3.50	1.11	0.03	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 58 Observations; mean 3.26	2.09*	0.92	0.87	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 3.47	1.18	0.14	0.11	-0.72	×	×
Condition 6 58 Observations; mean 3.83	-0.13	-1.15	-1.17	-2.08*	-1.24	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Monthly Household Income

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 55 Observations; mean 1.02	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 57 Observations; mean 1.02	0.00	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 56 Observations; mean 1.00	0.09	0.09	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 56 Observations; mean 1.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.16	×	×	×
Condition 5 53 Observations; mean 1.06	-0.15	-0.16	-0.22	-0.08	×	×
Condition 6 53 Observations; mean 1.25	-0.96	-1.00	-1.04	-0.86	-0.67	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Predominately Shia neighborhood

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 0.27	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 0.30	-0.40	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 0.38	-1.36	-0.96	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 0.38	-1.36	-0.96	0.00	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 0.25	0.21	0.61	1.57	1.57	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 0.22	0.64	1.04	2.01*	2.01*	0.43	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Predominately Sunni neighborhood

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 0.37	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 0.37	0.00	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 0.33	0.38	0.38	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 0.30	0.77	0.77	0.39	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 0.43	-0.74	-0.74	-1.12	-1.52	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 0.30	0.77	0.77	0.39	0.00	1.52	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

APPENDIX M. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MODELING

Table M1: Effects of expert appeal and participant discussion across all three tasks estimated using multilevel modeling

Model	Task 1 (Logistic)		Task 2 (OLS)		Task 3 (OLS)	
	Expert Appeal 1	Participant Discussion 2	Expert Appeal 3	Participant Discussion 4	Expert Appeal 5	Participant Discussion 6
Expert Appeal	-1.11* (0.44)		-1.10** (0.42)		0.24 (0.22)	
Participant Discussion		0.36 (0.51)		0.45 (0.42)		0.03 (0.21)
Lagged group contribution					0.14** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)
Constant	3.46* (1.66)	2.28 (1.62)	10.35** (1.42)	7.81** (1.43)	-3.50** (1.05)	-3.00** (0.99)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.04 (0.20)	0.20 (0.27)	0.00 (0.00)	0.13 (0.19)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.55 (0.50)	0.41 (0.48)	0.90 (0.41)	0.20 (0.31)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
sd (Residual)			4.46 (0.48)	4.69 (0.52)	3.18 (0.08)	3.04 (0.07)
Observations	212	205	212	206	856	828

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 correspond to Models 4 and 8 in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively, in the body. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Table M2: Effects of clientelism estimated using multilevel modeling

Model	A. Expert Appeal (Logistic)				B. Participant Discussion (Logistic)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Clientelism	1.02* (0.44)	0.97 (0.59)			1.15* (0.52)	1.13 (0.74)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer			1.77** (0.48)	2.14** (0.69)			2.00** (0.51)	1.35* (0.65)
Expert Appeal	-1.11* (0.44)	-1.18 (0.64)	-1.21** (0.47)	-0.90 (0.61)				
Clientelism × Expert Appeal		0.13 (0.87)						
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Expert Appeal				-0.73 (0.91)				
Participant Discussion					0.33 (0.52)	0.31 (0.76)	0.52 (0.51)	-0.05 (0.65)
Clientelism × Participant Discussion						0.03 (1.03)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Participant Discussion								1.36 (0.96)
Constant	4.11* (1.73)	4.15* (1.75)	3.18 (1.81)	2.84 (1.85)	2.86 (1.64)	2.87 (1.68)	2.71 (1.72)	3.12 (1.77)
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Random-effects Parameters								
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.08 (0.19)	0.08 (0.19)	0.10 (0.22)	0.12 (0.24)	0.29 (0.27)	0.29 (0.27)	0.24 (0.27)	0.23 (0.28)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.34 (0.41)	0.34 (0.41)	0.37 (0.45)	0.38 (0.46)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.36)	0.10 (0.40)
Observations	212	212	212	212	205	205	205	205

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 8 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 8 in Table 7 in the body. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Table M3: Treatment effects on cross-sectarian trust (models 1-4) and effect of trust on contributions in a public goods game (models 5-6) estimated using multilevel modeling

	A. Absolute cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		B. Relative cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		C. Contribution to public goods (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Expert Appeal	0.19 (0.30)		0.49 (0.29)			
Participant Discussion		0.42 (0.29)		0.16 (0.29)		
Absolute cross-sectarian trust					0.63** (0.11)	
Relative cross-sectarian trust						0.40** (0.10)
Lagged group contribution					0.15** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant					-4.68** (0.91)	-3.57** (0.93)
/cut1	-0.71 (1.39)	0.25 (1.28)	-1.46 (1.43)	-1.94 (1.35)		
/cut2	1.62 (1.40)	2.75* (1.29)	-0.16 (1.42)	-0.51 (1.32)		
/cut3	2.95* (1.42)	4.24** (1.31)	0.92 (1.42)	0.56 (1.32)		
/cut4			4.09** (1.46)	4.13** (1.38)		
/cut5			5.22** (1.54)	5.14** (1.45)		
/cut6			5.64** (1.59)	5.55** (1.50)		
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.02 (0.20)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.13 (0.57)	0.25 (0.35)
sd (Residual)					3.13 (0.07)	3.13 (0.07)
Observations	176	179	173	178	1060	1044

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 6 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 6 in Table 8 in the body; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

Table M4: Effect of discussion depth on sectarian voting (task 1), average contribution in the other-other allocation game (task 2), and average contribution in a public goods game (task 3), estimated using multilevel modeling

Model	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.14** (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Female participation	-0.93* (0.41)	-0.82 (0.50)	-0.17 (0.36)	-0.23 (0.40)	0.08 (0.26)	0.39 (0.29)
Youth participation	0.98* (0.44)	0.89 (0.51)	0.67 (0.39)	0.73 (0.41)	-0.14 (0.29)	-0.41 (0.31)
Lagged group contribution					0.15** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)
Constant	0.72 (1.09)	6.44* (2.97)	8.18** (0.96)	9.26** (2.26)	0.22 (0.85)	-2.34 (1.62)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.01 (0.22)	0.20 (0.46)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
sd (Residual)			5.26 (0.72)	5.03 (0.73)	3.20 (0.11)	3.14 (0.14)
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380


*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 6 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 6 in Table 9 in the body. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

APPENDIX N: VOTE CHOICE DISAGGREGATED BY ELECTION AND SECT

	Shia candidate		Sunni candidate	
	Shia participants	Sunni participants	Shia participants	Sunni participants
Election 1 (Strongly sectarian Shia candidate/ egalitarian Sunni candidate)	79	15	101	165
Election 2 (Egalitarian Shia candidate/ Strongly sectarian Sunni candidate)	161	95	19	85
Election 3* (Weakly sectarian Shia candidate/ egalitarian Sunni candidate)	89	16	90	163
Election 4 (Egalitarian Shia candidate/ Weakly sectarian Sunni candidate)	163	93	17	87

Note: * indicates the presence of missing observations; numbers in cells indicate the number of observations


APPENDIX O: VOTE CHOICE DISAGGREGATED BY SECT, ELECTION, AND TREATMENT



Note: Pearson's chi-squared test used; * <math><0.05</math>, ** <math><0.01</math>

APPENDIX P: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME

Figure: Average contribution levels in the public goods game across the experimental conditions.



Note: Dots correspond to average contributions; vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

The standard pattern of contributions in a public goods game is decreasing across multiple rounds as participants learn about the presence of shirkers and reduce their contributions. In our study, the pattern of contributions across rounds is stable to increasing. We find that whereas in most studies the proportion of conditional cooperators (those who are sensitive to how much others contribute) is about 50%, in our study conditional cooperators only make up 23-30% of the participant pool. Furthermore, a higher proportion of our conditional cooperators contribute more as opposed to less in subsequent rounds.

APPENDIX Q: TESTING FOR PRESENCE OF CEILING EFFECTS IN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON POOL IN THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME USING THE RANDOM-EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (Tobit)				B. Participant Discussion (Tobit)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Expert Appeal	0.09 (0.64)	0.31 (0.88)	3.79 (2.59)	5.19 (3.52)				
Participant Discussion					0.81 (0.64)	1.00 (0.82)	-0.72 (2.65)	-1.29 (3.34)
Lagged group contribution	0.07** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.14** (0.02)	0.19** (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)
Constant	-2.55 (3.13)	-7.09 (4.32)	-5.67 (4.37)	-10.40 (6.01)	-3.76 (3.06)	-7.06 (3.93)	3.03 (4.34)	2.00 (5.51)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group dummies	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Right-censoring (censored observations)	Y (327)	Y (327)	Y (327)	Y (327)	Y (356)	Y (356)	Y (356)	Y (356)
Left-censoring (censored observations)	N (0)	Y (150)	N (0)	Y (150)	N (0)	Y (103)	N (0)	Y (103)
Observations	856	856	856	856	828	828	828	828

*Note: Models 1-4 examine treatment effects in experimental conditions 2 & 5 against the baseline of conditions 1 & 4. Models 5-8 look at treatment effects in experimental conditions 3 & 6 against the baseline of 2 & 5; standard errors in parentheses; group dummies included to control for the fact that individuals are nested within groups; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

APPENDIX R: RELATIVE CROSS-SECTARIAN TRUST REGRESSION FROM TABLE 8 (OLS)

	Relative cross-sectarian trust	
	Model 1	Model 2
Expert Video	0.29 (0.15)	
Participant Discussion		0.05 (0.13)
Constant	-1.40 (0.81)	-1.11 (0.66)
Clientelism	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y
Observations	173	178
R^2	0.10	0.05

*Note: Model 1 uses observations from experimental conditions 1-2 and 4-5, whereas Model 2 uses observations from experimental conditions 2-3 and 5-6; Standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

APPENDIX S: DISCUSSION CODING RULES

N-1. Coding rules

- (1) There are three broad substantive rubrics: negative effects of sectarianism, causes of sectarianism, and solutions to sectarianism. A discussion participant's statement is coded every time he or she makes a statement relevant to any of these three broad categories (statements in each of the rubrics are coded separately). Identical statements made at different times within each of the three rubrics are counted as one single statement (i.e. there is no double counting within rubrics).
- (2) Participants might make statements that are inconsistent across the three substantive rubrics. Coding must reflect participants' statements; coders cannot impose consistency in the coding.
- (3) Participants often express their opinions by making brief affirmative or negative remarks (e.g., "True", "Right", or "No, I disagree") following substantive remarks by others. Such affirmative or negative utterances are counted as valid statements.
- (4) Agreement and disagreement are coded as 1 and -1, respectively. If a participant does not make a statement against a category then they are not assigned a score for that category.

N-2. Three rubrics and the 25 constituent subcategories.

Rubrics	Subcategories	Examples
Negative effects of sectarianism	Inter-sectarian conflict, tension, or threat	
	Inter-sectarian friendship or marriage/ family issues	
	Job, hospital, or school admission (<i>Wasta</i>)	
Causes of sectarianism	Political leadership or institutions	Quota system, sectarian assignment of governmental offices, or hereditary political power
	Lack of personal concern with sectarianism	
	Foreign influence	Neighboring Muslim countries, Israel, or USA
	Mass media	
	Sectarian education at school	
	Lack of nationalism or patriotism	
	Religious leadership	
Solutions to sectarianism	Syrian refugees	
	Reform of the political system	Reform of the electoral system, direct presidential elections.
	Civic education	
	Parental influence	

	Independence from foreign influence	
	Control over mass media	
	Non-sectarian education at school	Intersectarian textbooks
	Remove sect information from personal status records or ID card	
	Nationalism or patriotism	
	Participation in protest or social movement	
	Separation between church and state	Prohibition on political involvement by religious leaders
	Pensions	
	Military coup/military involvement in government	
	Mixing residential areas	
	Intersectarian marriage	

APPENDIX T: TABLE 9 REPLICATED WITH ADDITION OF AUTOMATED DISCUSSION TONE SCORE ALONGSIDE DISCUSSION DEPTH SCORE.

Effect of discussion depth on sectarian voting (task 1), ingroup favoritism (task 2), and average contribution in a public goods game (task 3).

Model	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.14** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Discussion tone	1.75* (0.86)	2.18 (1.48)	0.24 (1.20)	-0.27 (1.28)	2.58** (0.61)	2.58** (0.85)
Female participation	-0.71 (0.38)	-0.40 (0.47)	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.41 (0.37)	1.07* (0.42)	1.42** (0.49)
Youth participation	-0.18 (0.60)	-1.52 (1.02)	0.43 (0.24)	0.64* (0.29)	-1.60** (0.46)	-1.85** (0.63)
Lagged group contribution					0.07** (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)
Constant	2.31* (1.11)	12.11* (4.87)	9.82** (0.86)	10.33** (2.03)	1.53 (0.88)	-2.92 (1.70)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380
R^2	0.26	0.39	0.16	0.23	0.28	0.33

*Note: All models use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6; standard errors, clustered at group level, are in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

**APPENDIX U: EFFECT OF DISCUSSION DURATION AND LENGTH OF
MODERATOR INTERVENTION ON COOPERATION LEVELS ACROSS THE
THREE TASKS**

Model	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Allocation to an anonymous co-sectarian in the other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.12** (0.02)	-0.13** (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)	0.10* (0.05)
Discussion duration (minutes)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)
Moderator intervention (minutes)	-0.06 (0.40)	-0.61 (0.57)	-0.60* (0.26)	-0.82** (0.27)	0.12 (0.30)	-0.00 (0.38)
Female participation	-1.28** (0.47)	-1.78* (0.78)	-0.73** (0.25)	-0.84** (0.22)	0.57 (0.37)	0.88* (0.42)
Youth participation	0.42 (0.50)	-0.04 (0.73)	0.93* (0.35)	1.32** (0.39)	-1.11* (0.49)	-1.28* (0.57)
Lagged group contribution					0.08** (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)
Constant	3.19 (3.19)	13.70* (6.98)	12.62** (1.76)	12.74** (2.46)	1.87 (1.99)	-1.65 (2.60)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380
R^2	0.25	0.39	0.19	0.27	0.27	0.33

Note: The statistical significances on the coefficients of the variable for discussion depth do not substantively vary when only one of the two variables for discussion duration and moderator intervention is added to the statistical models.

APPENDIX V: DETERMINANTS OF THE EXTENT OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSION

	Model 1
Shia	0.07 (0.91)
Understanding of instructions	-0.26 (0.38)
Female	0.53 (0.58)
Age	0.07** (0.02)
Education	0.36 (0.20)
Household wealth	0.29 (0.26)
Shia residential neighborhood	-0.64 (0.73)
Sunni residential neighborhood	-0.20 (0.98)
Constant	-1.00 (1.88)
Clientelism	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y
Observation	95
R^2	0.20

*Note: Model 1 analyzes observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6 using OLS regression; participation in discussion is measured as a participant's individual score; standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.*

APPENDIX W: DISTRIBUTION OF DISCUSSION SCORES AND PAIRWISE COMPARISONS OF INACTIVE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS' DISCUSSION SCORES AS A PRODUCT OF GROUP CHARACTERISTICS


1. Distribution of one's own discussion scores and other participants' discussion scores

		One's own discussion (Median:4, Mean: 4.20)												
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Other participants' discussion (Median:20, Mean:21.01)	11					2		2						
	12				5									
	13			3				2		1				
	14		1											
	15	1		1			1	3						
	16		3			3						2		
	17			3	1	1	2							
	18		1		3	1	2							
	19				2	2			1	1				
	20	1	3	1	1				1		1			
	21	1		1			1	3			1	1		
	22					2	2							
	23				2	1		1	1					1
	24			2	1			2						1
	25		2	1		2		1			1			
	26		2		2		1							
	27					1								
	28			1	2				1					
	29						1							
	30	1				1	2							
31				1	1									
32			1	1						1				
33														
34								3						
35							1							
36						1								

Note: Numbers in cells indicate the number of observations (114 in total); empty cells have no observations.


2. Pairwise comparisons according to one's own discussion participation and others' discussion participation

- Active participant: if individual score is above the median of 4
- Inactive participant: if individual score is equal to or below the median of 4
- Active group discussion: if the median score for remaining five group members is above the median of 20
- Inactive group discussion: if the media score for remaining five group members is equal to or below the median of 20
- Results are very similar if means are used instead of medians.



Note: 39 inactive participants with inactive others; 29 inactive participants with active others; 19 active participants with inactive others; 27 active participants with active others


Note: The difference (0.35) between inactive participants with inactive others and with active others is significant ($p < 0.01$); the difference (-0.01) between active participants with inactive others and with active others is insignificant; the difference (0.38) between inactive participants with inactive others and active participants with inactive others is significant ($p < 0.01$); the difference (0.02) between inactive participants with active others and active participants with active others is insignificant; Pearson's chi-squared test used.



Note: 39 inactive participants with inactive others; 29 inactive participants with active others; 19 active participants with inactive others; 27 active participants with active others

Note: The difference (1.38) between inactive participants with inactive others and with active others is significant ($t = 2.36$); the difference (0.57) between active participants with inactive others and with active others is insignificant ($t = 0.81$); the difference

(1.36) between inactive participants with inactive others and active participants with inactive others is insignificant ($t=1.77$); the difference (0.55) between inactive participants with active others and active participants with active others is insignificant ($t=1.10$); two-sided t -test used.



Note: 39 inactive participants with inactive others; 29 inactive participants with active others; 19 active participants with inactive others; 27 active participants with active others; 5 observations from each participant

Note: The difference (-0.49) between inactive participants with inactive others and with active others is insignificant ($t=-1.19$); the difference (-0.55) between active participants with inactive others and with active others is insignificant ($t=-1.06$); the difference (-0.15) between inactive participants with inactive others and active participants with inactive others is insignificant ($t=-0.29$); the difference (-0.21) between inactive participants with active others and active participants with active others is insignificant ($t=-0.50$); two-sided t -test used.